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This article discusses, from an historical-neo-institutionalist and relational-strate- 
gic perspective, the postmodern thesis of the end of the state due to the increasing 
processes of world globalization. The main hypothesis is that the arguments which 
predict the structural crisis or the disappearance of the State in the age of 
neo-liberal globalization have their roots in a theoretically and historically im-
plausible concept of sovereignty that ignores and distorts central aspects of state-
hood and state-building in terms of both institutional structure and political ac-
tion. The myth of the “origins” of the State in Medieval or Renaissance times 
shares with the postmodern vision of the “vanishing” of the state, the same un-
derlying misconception of the scope and limits of the state power. Sovereignty 
(the monopolization of political power) was always a claim, a desiderata, a con-
tested and unfinished political project not an accomplished empirical fact. 
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1. Introduction 
The thesis I defend in this text is that the arguments which predict the disap-
pearance or crisis of the State in the age of neo-liberal globalization have their 
roots in a theoretically and historically implausible concept, which ignores and 
distorts central aspects of statehood in terms of both institutional structure and 
political action. In the following pages, I will propose a perspective that is both 
historical neo-institutionalist and relational to proceed to criticism of the hur-
ried death certificates of this “mortal god” which is so frequent these days. 
2. Concept and Evolutionist Process of State Building 
The concept of State, in a modern sense, defines the complex and varied process 
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of construction (“state building”) of a system of specific domination, characte-
rized by the institutional monopoly of political power and of legitimate violence. 
This definition requires some clarification: 1) in spite of the fact that the term 
“State” is present in many different historical contexts, it has diverse conceptual 
meanings and refers, quite often, to very different realities from that of the State 
in the strictest sense. The term “State” prior to the revolutions of the modern 
world designates, strictly speaking, pre-State forms of domination (“city States”, 
“Renaissance State”, “Modern State”, “absolutist State” etc.), characterized by the 
absence of the decisive conceptual feature that we consider to be indispensable: 
the monopoly of political power (legislative, judicial, executive, fiscal, military), 
in an organizational-institutional entity that splits off and becomes independent 
of civil society; 2) the State does not constitute the natural and logical result of 
the historical evolution of political forms, an inevitable and teleological point of 
arrival predetermined since the beginning of time. On the contrary, for centu-
ries, the centralized territorial monarchies competed with very different formu-
lae of organization of political power: city States, the Papacy, Empires, domi-
nions and decentralized signoras etc. The State emerged as a possible and con-
tingent result of a process, complex and multicausal, evolutive, adaptative and 
competitive, during which it eventually proved to be the most suitable formula 
to govern an extensive territory with a large population and maintain a standing 
army; 3) the progressive establishment of the new predominant logic of state-
hood and the subsequent triple conceptual rupture (Sovereignty), economic 
(Capitalism) and political (Revolution) between the world of States and of 
pre-State forms of domination, should not conceal, however, the fact that part of 
processes of State construction originates intellectually, socially and politically 
from elements already present within the prior late-feudal logic (centralized 
Monarchies, absolute Monarchies). In addition, it was always a tentative and in-
complete process, the claims for “sovereignty” and the complete monopoly of 
political power in a territory were always idealistic aspirations and never fully 
crystallized realities. The process of concentration of political power was much 
disputed, underwent continuous advances and reverses, as a consequence of 
multiple internal and external challenges. Neither did there exist a single path or 
a final stage, uniform and homogenous, for standard configuration of a State, for 
these varied considerably depending on country or historical circumstances, 
both in their effective state capacities (bureaucratic, military, fiscal, law and or-
der etc.), and in their decantation into political regimes (monarchic or republi-
can, civil or military, democratic or authoritarian etc.). 
From a perspective born of evolutionism and historical neo-institutionalism, 
the State is, in its strict conceptual sense, an adaptative and changing political 
system, a variegated and emerging set of instruments, procedures, rules and or-
ganisations, strategically selective of preferences and identities. These institu-
tions are notable for their capacity to facilitate the taking of decisions, to imple-
ment the latter and render them acceptable to the citizens of a specific territory, 




as the fulfillment of ideas of the common good and/or national interest. But the 
State is not and has never been a neutral and completely independent apparatus 
vis-à-vis the society it seeks to regulate, but is, in turn, coshae by the latter and 
acts with strategic selectiveness, favouring certain social interests and individual 
(citizens) and collective (Nation) identities marginalising other possible prefe-
rences and other identity-based alternatives, via its public policies and its insti-
tutional designs. The State is a social relation that depends ultimately upon a 
specific correlation of political forces. Therefore, rather than a unified institu-
tional entity, stitched together once and for all by the principle of sovereignty, it 
is the contingent result of the political struggles for hegemony (the intellectual 
and moral leadership of a country) which are part of -with their defeats and their 
victories—its own institutional materiality. In these institutions the State exer-
cises, via diverse selective incentives, an infrastructural power of penetration, 
organisation and redistribution over society, in a specific territory and at the 
service of different social classes (Poulantzas, 1978; Mann, 1986, 1993; Jessop, 
2016). 
For these reasons it is advisable to adopt a relational and strategic perspective, 
since the modern State is not presented as a static and isolated structure, but as 
the result, provisional and very varied, of a process of evolution, competition 
and adaptation, caused by both exogenous shocks (economical, political or mili-
tary), and political mobilizations and endogenous conflicts. This multicausal 
process, very different in its rhythms, characteristics and crystallizations from 
country to country, condenses, to a diverse degree, the effect of various factors. 
The latter, as explicative variables at once differentiated and interdependent, 
combine and explain, to a greater or lesser degree, each particular State, de-
pending on the different contexts and ecologies in which the latter develops. The 
basic factors which intervene in the production of a State are: 1) War, coercion 
and the procurement of security; 2) the Institutions of legitimate deci-
sion-making (representation); 3) Capitalism, as a mode of production from the 
initial network of commercial cities to the creation of national and international 
markets, colonialism and imperialism; 4) Territory and the demarcation of bor-
ders, 5) the Population and its biopolitical production as people, nation and ci-
tizenry; 6) the intellectual conditions of State construction: Ideas (sovereignty), 
theories of State, the development of political thought, ideologies and discourses 
in conflict. 
3. The Pre-State World: “City States”, “Renaissance State”  
and “Dynastic State” 
To denominate the exceptional mode of domination of the “City States” or the 
“New Monarchies of the Renaissance” with the term “State”, even in its variants 
of “Modern State” or “Renaissance State”, only deforms the complex and irre-
ducible reality of their specific political configuration and distorts—decontex- 
tualising and modernising—the political-institutional substantiveness of those 




empirical-conceptual reconstruction. The historiographical misperception of the 
“Modern State” and the “Raison d’État”—eflection, in turn, of the abusive exten-
sion of the contemporary concept of State, typical of capitalist society, conceals 
the political-institutional reality of the centralized or absolute European monar-
chies under construction (Spain, France ...) in the 15th and 16th centuries, and 
completely distorts the political reality of Renaissance Italy. It appears as if the 
political use, even with other specific meanings, of the same term, “status”, “sta-
to”, or “State”, at that time, justifies the retroprojection of the concept of State, 
specified and elaborated much later as an abstract public body separate from civ-
il society. 
The historiography of political institutions has proceeded for years, in the 
wake of both greater empirical clarification and new conceptual precision, to 
link up with another classical, albeit minority, line of European research, tradi-
tionally aware of the discontinuity between the medieval and true modernity, in 
other words, between feudalism and capitalism. It is important to recall that an 
entire series of researchers, since the 1930s, have highlighted, in very diverse 
fields, the essential discontinuity between the dispersion of the hierarchised po-
litical power of late feudalism and the monopolization of the latter in one single 
authority that rises before civil society, characteristic of capitalism. The rupture, 
to sum up, between the kingdom of privilege, by definition unequal, and that of 
equal rights; between the world of the feudal income and that of capital; of the 
subject of the vassalistic relations of subjection and the citizen rendered equal by 
the law. Only if we pay heed to this structural watershed between the pre-capi- 
talist, in other words, pre-state modes of domination, and to the arduous con-
solidation of a single centre of attribution of political power and only then, 
strictly speaking, Sovereign, alone worthy of the concept of State, will we be able 
to take adequate account of the far from lineal and very varied process of con-
centration and centralization of power by means of which the latter is con-
structed: dynastic territorial monarchies, absolute monarchies, national absolut-
ism, revolutionary State etc. 
If on the one hand it is necessary to retain the political and social capital that 
illuminates the birth of the State, on the other it is no less true that the latter is 
not born of nothing, but within a long process of tradition, possessed of a spe-
cific rhythm and driven by various factors within the more general transition 
from feudalism to capitalism and its breaking points (“bourgeois revolutions”). 
A process via which is constructed the central apparatus of the State, the admin-
istration, the army, the treasury, the organization of the territory itself and its 
borders, the nation and the citizenry. A process which, incidentally, in Italy, 
where the “origins” of the State were so often sought, underwent such excep-
tional difficulties of every kind which truncated the process of conversion to 
State. Narration of so complex and prolonged a transition, maintaining the spe-
cific empiricity of concepts, the irreducible historicity of categories and episte-
mological awareness of any presentist reading of the supposedly “state” past, has 




Brunner, Böckenförde, etc., or more recent ones like Rokkan, Spruyt, Tilly, 
Mann or Tarrow, amongst others, whose consideration becomes, however, deci-
sive when it comes to addressing with a critical vision of the “lo stato” in Re-
naissance Italy. 
Thus, for Hintze, from a Weberian perspective, demarcation, within an ideal 
type of State, of four stages with distinct specific characteristics in their historic-
ity, serves to frame the progressive ruptures within the process of construction 
of a State with sovereign power, based upon the hierarchic, feudal constitution of 
the Middle Ages. This gradually dissolves as freedom from the tutelage of the 
Church increases and what is configured, very slowly, is a new apparatus of 
power, in the sphere of the European system of “dynastic States”, which will take 
the place of the universal clerical/secular monarchy of the Middle Ages. “Sove-
reignty”, as a historical concept, refers to this process of gradual hierarchisation, 
of appropriation by the Crown of princely fiefdoms by means of self-placement 
of the monarch within and, finally, at the top of the trabada pirámide of dynastic 
legitimacy. Such was the nature of that “sovereignty” that only approached (but 
never fully achieved) its theoretical program in practice as a result of the same 
process that would lead to the servant’s liberation from the herrschaft, the 
craftsman’s from the guild, the trader’s from his association. In short, when ca-
pitalism permeates the whole of society or, as Marx would note, when capitalism 
replaces feudal income and capitalist relations of production prevail over feudal 
ones. Capitalism develops, therefore, in close collaboration with the State and its 
full blossoming is also that of the State in a strict sense, but not until the 19th 
century (Hintze, 1970). 
Otto Brunner, on the basis of Carl Schmitt’s distinction between Verfassung 
and Konstitution, reserving the contemporary signification of State of liber-
al-bourgeois Law for the latter, proceeds systematically to criticise those German 
authors who apply the idea of Konstitution to the medieval. An error that pre-
supposes the ahistorical and implausible existence of the absolute State and its 
military and administrative apparatus, the separation between public and private 
Law, in other words: between civil society and State, between customary Law 
and positive Law. Brunner was also highly critical of the acceptance, implicit or 
explicit, of the criterion of Sovereignty in order to analyze the State prior to ab-
solutism and the “Absolute Monarchy” itself. In his opinion, Sovereignty insofar 
as it essentially involves effective concentration of political power, requires se-
paration between civil society and State, since only then does the latter rise over 
society as a whole, accumulating and transforming previously dispersed powers 
(fiscal, legislative, judicial etc.). For this reason, only the contemporary State in 
the 19th century attains sovereignty, monopoly of political power and legal per-
sonality, now indeed invoking genuine “raison d’État”, and as such emanates 
positive law understood as new law. Previously, although European sovereigns 
claimed a plenitudo potestatis, this did not make them sovereign in the modern 
sense, that is, in the recognition and fulfillment of such a claim to supreme deci-
sion-making competence. For centuries, King and territorial prince possessed if 




of poderes señoriales precluded this. “Sovereignty”, was but a disputed, nego-
tiated and unstable hierarchy over the variegated fabric of powers and privileges 
that demanded to be respected (Brunner, 1980). 
Neither would the late-medieval city reveal the “origins” of the constitutional 
State, via the reconciliation of seignory and civil community. Böckenförde hig-
hlighted the extrapolations of the concepts of citizenry, autonomy and associa-
tion in a world that owed much to other political-institutional parameters. In an 
order, time and place where neither these concepts nor these structures existed, 
some authors like Gierke and many others translated all the categories belonging 
to that age into concepts that rang of the present (“citizenry”, “State”, “repre-
sentation” etc.), endowing them with evaluation and status, ahistorically, solely 
on the basis of subsequent contemporary realities (Böckenförde, 1961). Pareto 
rightly termed this way of proceeding, “prejudice of origins”. 
Hence the exception to the contrary of Renaissance Italy as opposed to the 
centralized European monarchies, not so much due to the permanence of un-
iversalist and territorial institutions like the Papacy, but owing to the premature 
development of merchant capital in the cities of the north, which would establish 
the bases for fierce political resistance to the unification of a late-feudal network 
of domination, which extended to the entire Italian territory. In this way, the 
exceptional political-cultural development of the cities of the north known as 
Renaissance—and the simultaneous eclipse of the Empire and the Papacy-ren- 
dered that territory a unique case, far removed from the construction of Euro-
pean States. A whole series of autonomous city-republics, centres of intense 
commercial activity, dynamic areas in the interstices of the feudal production 
model of the countryside, motivated by an autonomous logic as complex com-
mercial and industrial entities, possessed of their own mechanisms of govern-
ment, they formed a variegated mosaic that needs to be inserted, in spite of eve-
rything, in a vaster political-territorial space. The distance between the cities, as 
neuralgic centres of power, and the feudal countryside cannot conceal an essen-
tial dependence. The tension that existed between the two spheres was produced 
in parallel to an enlarged reproduction of feudalism which found its driving 
force in the cities. For this reason, not only the diverse plurality of the latter, but 
their interpenetration with/estrangement from the feudal world surrounding 
them was key to the fact that neither Florence, Milan nor Venice could dominate 
one another. And a consequence of this deadlock, as an internal cause, is the 
persistent, fragmented Italian weakness against European monarchies: isolated 
commercial development—further hampered within the cities by feudal institu-
tions like guilds and workers’ associations—resulted in destructuring and pulve-
rization of a territorial space, unimaginable for the moment as either “State” or 
“Nation” (“Italy”). Though it is true that the poderes señoriales that prevailed in 
the cities produced advanced elements of organisation and centralisation upon a 
triple axis: Army, Diplomacy and Bureaucracy. In this context, there were unde-
niably innovative phenomena such as the well-known fact that via treaties or 




that acts of feudal investiture required the permission of the lord or the city; that 
commercial associations were denied political power; that laws were passed of 
general validity for larger territories; in short, that jurisdictional courts were set 
up for whatever purpose, etc. It is these very bases that have traditionally been 
regarded as the foundations of the conception of “Renaissance State” or home to 
the effective presence of “Raison d’État”. Quite to the contrary, the Republics 
and Principalities of the Renaissance, enclaves within the feudal world, from 
which they were separated by distance and various tensions, constituted in their 
disparate phases of economic development, and disparate political structures, 
spaces in permanent crisis, threatened externally by European monarchies and 
internally incapable of unifying a vaster “Italian” space which resembled a chao-
tic foule d’incoherences. All this found its paradigm in Il Principe as holder of 
dominion, the stato as power derived from princely virtú, as its adventitious and, 
therefore, unstable and always precarious property, deprived of any dynastic le-
gitimation, of any network of loyalties, of any historical-institutional security, of 
any legal-constitutional guarantee. 
Hence that permanent and irresolvable rift in the works of Machiavelli: the 
word “stato” sometimes subjectively designates the lord of the domain, the pos-
sessor of the potere efettuale, but on other occasions, objectively, the territory 
subjected to this power; its union is never presented analytically, nor is it post-
ulated, stable and organic, intrinsic but personal, not structural but arbitrary, 
adventitious, contingent ... Mantenere lo stato is but the motto derived from the 
considerable precariousness of a power devoid of stable support, of principalities 
subject to the caprice of the avarice of military leaders and adventurers, of vi-
olence deprived of the customary channels, of the pillage fostered by the lack of 
dynastic legitimation, of the insecurity co-natural to the absence of hierarchy 
and loyalty of jurisdictional-territorial seigniories. 
The political and administrative inability to articulate in minimally structured 
fashion, via vasallistic allegiances, warring and competitive territorial spaces in 
the European context, in short, the impossibility of constructing a dynastically 
legitimate monarchy from and above civic mercantilism, thwarted from the start 
the possibility of creating ample spaces of political power centralised around the 
city States . The reference Works of Tilly, Spruyt or Tarrow follow the same line 
of argument (Tilly, 1990; Spruyt, 1994; Tarrow, 2004; Maiz, 2016) which may be 
synthesised as follows:  
1) War was the great maker of States but, unlike the centralised territorial 
monarchies, the Italian city states were incapable, owing to their internal struc-
ture, to employ it beyond its immediate purpose towards ends of long-term State 
building;  
2) Unlike the territorial monarchies of the day, the city states were unable to 
combine capital economic resources with appropriate institutional designs in 
order to build, upon the basis of a shared idea of “common good”, above the 
conflicting interests of the élites, authentic States, territorially and legally unified;  




ture and oligarchic in their content-proved to be incapable of constructing an 
institutional casing via which to filter and process the particular interests of the 
ruling classes, and to generate the culture and trust necessary to establish a le-
gitimate power;  
4) The direct penetration of the interests of the ruling classes into the “politi-
cal” sphere, without lasting or foreseeable institutional mediation, was but the 
correlative of the permanent overflow of the extra-institutional conflict and the 
chronic popular uprisings (i.e. “Ciompi”). As Anderson says, despite their ap-
parently advanced modernism of means and technique and their famous inau-
guration of pure politics, of power as such, las señorías were, in fact, intrinsically 
incapable of generating the characteristic form of government of the first mod-
ern age, unitary monarchic absolutism (Anderson, 1974). 
And what about the European centralised territorial monarchies? Modern 
historiography has repeatedly highlighted the error involved in over-estimating 
the “state2, “absolutist” aspects in particular, of those dynastic orders and struc-
tures, preferring to underline, in very different manner, their unmistakeable 
character of specific formation, unquestionably a legacy of the old world of 
privilege. Thus, the increase of political power in the hands of the princes cannot 
conceal the fact of its compatibility with the persistence and even the increased 
reproduction of the laws of local ordinances, which on occasions reinforced their 
strength and survived, on others, safe from outside interference. This continued 
disintegration of power, beneath the theological-political glitz of The King’s Two 
Bodies-Rex qui nunquam moritur (Kantorowicz, 1957) should be highlighted in 
all its harshness insofar as it reveals an overlapping of various privileges, a patent 
absence, ultimately, of Sovereignty. The process of political centralisation was 
effected by means of the aggregation of particularities, of compact nuclei of 
power which retained much of their autonomy, particular order and institu-
tional substantiveness, without at any moment being cancelled out by their in-
clusion in larger organisations. The processes of unification of the las señorías 
were combined, with absolute centrality and not with merely residual natural-
ness, the permanent counterbalance of a propensity to acknowledge and legiti-
mise the old “bodies” or “arms”, as well as the diverse local ordinances. On top 
of that, to the “local freedoms”, “popular franchises” and inherited privileges 
were added the concession of newly created privileges, various local freedoms 
and vicariates which clearly demonstrate the essential feudal continuity of the 
mechanisms of political reproduction. The world of privilege, in short, not only 
far from breaks up, but its fabric expanded reticulately, driven from the nuclei of 
real power: municipalism maintained its charters; the trade corporations, despite 
their new subordination to the señor, generally retained their own jurisdictions; 
the clergy also enjoyed the latter as well as diverse fiscal immunities; cities and 
territories continued to possess many and even acquired new franchises and 
freedoms ... Within the cities themselves, a las trabas reglamentistas de los gre-
mios se superponía una estofa capilar of internal privileges, of diverse statuses, a 




tics, depriving of meaning the subsequent distinction between civil society and 
State. What State puede predicarse de such a reformulation of fiefdom, of privi-
lege, of the plural dispersion of power in the most diverse entities? What sover-
eignty can be read into the assembly of property and jurisdictional dominion, 
into the extra-economic coercion that, as Marx interpreted with such lucidness 
in his day, constitutes the basis of feudal income making a mere anecdote of the 
full ownership of the earth? 
Neither the “Renaissance State”, nor the “Modern State” were genuine States, 
in the strict sense of the concept, for many reasons: 
1. Thee monarchies of the age were dynastic non-national “States”, the mon-
archs defended the interests of the King, of his family, of his dynasty, not of the 
country, of the Kingdom or, much less, of the “nation”; 
2. These monarchies were very limited by local privileges and customs. It was 
very difficult for the Monarch to complement Iurisdictio with Gubernaculum 
from the vertex of a pyramid of loyalties that, whilst hierarchically they raised 
him as the head upon the body and arms of the kingdom, they tied his hands 
with various commitments; 
3. These “States” were, in spite of all the efforts made and some significant 
progress in this direction, fundamentally decentralised and non-centralised. This 
was a world of local jurisdictions (privileges), fragmentation and dispersion of 
power in society as a whole, and of systematic inequality before the law; 
4. This was not a system of domination based on the State but on “States” or 
“estates” with special privileges, and the class that dominated these was the 
secular and ecclesiastic nobility, never the bourgeoisie of the cities; 
5. Bureaucracy and the army, in spite of the undeniable advances, were too 
weak to guarantee the internal and external sovereignty of the territory, and the 
disproportionate fiscal effort to maintain a competitive standing army usually 
led to popular resistance and uprising, uncontrolled debt and the financial ruin 
of the monarchy; 
6. Not only were privileges maintained in many cases, but to ensure the sup-
port of the nobility or to obtain resources for war, monarchs were forced to 
concede new territorial privileges, tax exemptions, sale of public office etc.;  
7. Moreover, in order to obtain resources (men and money) to maintain a 
standing army, Monarchs were obliged to summon and/or reactivate various 
representative assemblies of the dominant orders, or to create a “Court Society” 
in order to negotiate support in exchange for concessions of privileges and local 
freedoms; 
8. This model of decentralised and very limited government, always delicately 
balanced between King and Kingdom, resulted in the more or less belated ap-
pearance of a fixed capital and in the need for monarchs to move around their 
kingdoms in order to maintain them precariously united under a control that 
was always challenged from the exterior by other monarchs, and from within by 
secular or ecclesiastic nobles. 




tems born of an organisational logic radically different from that of the State in 
the strict sense, that is, the monopoly of political power and legitimate violence; 
2) however, the fact that these were two different logics should not conceal the 
fact that certain capacities and organisational developments gradually made pos-
sible the arrival of a new organisational structure, that of the State -territorial 
nation and that of sovereignty in the strict sense; 3) in this way, the process of 
formation of the State arises from elements such as the monetisation of the 
economy, the expansion of trade, the growth of cities, the military revolution of 
modern warfare etc. Which may be regarded as proto-capacities (Sassen, 2006) 
for the political construction of a centralised and, finally, exclusive authority in a 
territory; 4) lastly, the clash and mutual weakening of other formats of organisa-
tion of power like Church and Empire proved crucial to the emergence of the 
State and its pretensions of sovereignty.  
Neither can we regard as States, in the strict conceptual sense, the absolute 
Monarchies, although they did introduce elements of statehood, which, however, 
occupied a place within the old prevailing pre-state logic. These Monarchies 
were in no way “absolute”, since absolutism, despite its name, never knew the 
figure of a monarch entirely legibus solutus. The powers of the Monarch, in spite 
of his “absolutist” pretensions, were restricted by counterbalances and powers 
distributed throughout society. Furthermore, the limits and centres of power 
competing with the absolutist “State” were always capable of considerable resis-
tance: representative assemblies (courts) and cities, lay and ecclesiastical nobility 
with their respective legal privileges and tax exemptions, maintenance of territo-
rial and provincial rights, a system of government shared between king and 
kingdom and, finally, insufficient development and depersonalised institution-
alisation of bureaucracy.  
Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the pre-state systems of 
domination analysed thus far. The city States and the decentralised duchies vic-
tims of the centralised territorial monarchies, for the latter, introducing various 
elements of statehood (bureaucracy, treasury, standing army etc.), evolved, via 
the absolute monarchies, towards a process of state-building that would eventu-
ally give rise to an entirely new political reality. The process of State-building set 
in motion a new evolutive and adaptive logic, uneven, with different temporali-
ties in different countries and with advances and reverses, never linear, but 
which would eventually crystallise into a radical discontinuity with the past. This 
logic develops via the intervention of the six aforementioned factors; let us con-
sider them briefly: 
1) The starting point of the process of State-building was war in its twin sense: 
international, between political units seeking to acquire territory and resources, 
and interior or civil in order to placate populations when faced with internal up-
risings and allow for fiscal and administrative control and law and order in the 
territory. In a world at war the only political units that survived were those best 
equipped to maintain a large, well-armed and loyal standing army. In this kind 




other competitors like city States, decentralised duchies (like that of Burgundy) 
or the late-feudal Empires and the Papacy. 
2) The organisation of a standing army not only required a broad territorial 
dimension in order to recruit men and obtain resources, it also necessitated ad-
ministration, in other words, Bureaucracy and a Tax Authority capable of or-
ganising the territory, collecting taxes, administering and legitimating them: 
Government, Treasury and Parliamentary representation constitutes three basic 
elements, which were added to the traditional administration of Justice, accom-
panied by the production of derecho igual, obligatory and forcibly imposed 
throughout the territory and the gradual repeal of particular privileges and ex-
emptions. 
3) States created national markets: unified law, minted currency, standardised 
prices, eliminated obstacles such as privileges, local taxes and income or guild 
regulation of trades, kept transport routes clear of criminals, created infrastruc-
tures to improve commerce and production, opened colonial spaces that bene-
fitted traders, granted monopolies that guaranteed patronage, and developed the 
mercantile, civil and penal legislation without which markets could not exist. In 
this process, the role of the cities and the bourgeois class, their interests and their 
ideologies were crucial both as nuclei of intensive accumulation and concentra-
tion of capital, and for their participation in the construction of networks of cir-
culation of capital and their conversion into progressively dependent centres of 
the law, the army and the domination of States . So, then, the State does not “in-
terfere”, intervene or “disrupt” supposedly free markets: the State creates the 
markets (Reich, 2015: p. 5). 
4) The above elements contribute to control, dominate and, in effect, politi-
cally produce the territory of the State by means of sovereignty both internal 
(monopoly of political power and legitimate violence) and external (acknowl-
edgement as competitive subject in the international sphere of the system of 
States as equivalent units). The creation of fixed and stable borders is the tran-
script of the military, policing, bureaucratic and financial organisation of the 
State in a chain that indissolubly links territory, population and sovereignty. 
5) The population of a (large) territory provides, on the one hand, the human 
resources needed for the army and the economic resources, money and supplies, 
necessary to be competitive. Meanwhile this also demands the collection of taxes 
and the creation of a Public Treasury (and the correlative elimination of local 
treasuries, privileges and exemptions), which refers us, in turn, to the genesis of 
legitimation of the latter via representative organs (courts, parliaments and 
councils), and the negotiation of the concession of rights, and to the conflicts of 
citizens and their individual rights. But also to political struggles for freedoms, 
by the extension of property rights, freedom, equality and political representa-
tion (the transition from selective to universal suffrage) and their constitutional 
consolidation. As a consequence of all this, the population of the territory of the 
State begins to be politically disciplined not only as the people of the State (set of 




litical production of common identity, a language, a history, a shared narrative, a 
community “we” that separates one’s own from another’s, friend from enemy. 
This process is crucial for both legitimation of domination and for fiscal and 
military sacrifices. 
6) Finally, a decisive factor in the process of state-building are ideas, since in 
order to exist the concept of State also requires intellectual conditions of possi-
bility, in other words, it needs to be thought out, imagined, theoretically elabo-
rated with concepts like “sovereignty”, “law”, “constitution”, “representation” 
etc. The State produces and is produced via ideas and via institutional and eco-
nomic material processes. Moreover, the power of ideas, the capacity of individ-
ual and collective actors to influence the values, beliefs and principles of other 
actors, plays a fundamental role in the development of statehood. The struggle 
and the rivalry between projects of statehood, ideas and ideologies constitute a 
vital dimension of the emergence and diverse hegemonic crystallisations of the 
modern State. 
4. “National State”, “Liberal-Democratic State” and  
“Regulatory State” 
State-building in the strict sense, that is, as a monopoly of political power and 
legitimate violence which achieves autonomy and separates from civil society, 
involves the emergence and generalisation of this wholly new dominant logic. A 
logic that, however, is 1) neither homogenous in every case, 2) nor simultaneous 
in every country, 3) nor exclusive, for it coexists for a certain period with 
pre-state remnants.  
Very briefly, the process of State-building interrelates three fundamental ele-
ments: 1) social classes, 2) States and 3) Nations. And it does this via, at least, 
four processes that are successive and, at the same time, in some way superim-
posed and never linear: 1) the revolutionary mobilisations of rupture with the 
Ancien Régime, 2) the organisational, institutional and mythical-symbolic con-
struction of the national State, 3) the uneven developments of the State Liberal 
democratic, constitutional representative State and the extension of citizenship; 
and 4) that of the State that regulated the economy and welfare (Mann, 1993; 
Rokkan, 1999; Finer, 1997). 
Only after the double English revolution of the 17th century does a State begin 
to emerge which accumulates and reorganises previously disperse political 
power, which is why it is the work of Hobbes and not that of Bodin where the 
concept of sovereignty attains its genuinely modern meaning: not simply as a 
position of hierarchical superiority of one of the powers (the monarch) over 
others, whom it is obliged to respect, but as the only political power existing in a 
given territory. “Transferir todo el poder and toda la fuerza a un hombre o una 
asamblea de hombres” (Hobbes), in other words, to an institution that monopo-
lises political power and which can be articulated as either Republic or Monar-
chy. From this moment the State begins to reshape itself as State-Nation, via 




ing to Rokkan’s seminal schema, these processes are structured in a basic model 
of centre-periphery tension of four dimensions which are co-involved; namely: 
1) violence (army, law and order, administration), 2) economy (production and 
distribution), 3) law (constitution, positive legislation, representation) and 4) 
culture (myths, symbols, languages). Processes of interaction and variation 
which, in turn, depend on four fundamental explicative variables: 1) secular/re- 
ligious configuration, 2) linguistic unification/differentiation, 3) dependence 
on/Independence of the network of cities, and 4) concentration/dispersion of 
ownership of land. In a diachronic perspective it is possible, moreover, to estab-
lish a sequence of diverse phases in the aforementioned process of State-build- 
ing : I) territorial penetration (tax system, law and order, legal resolution of con-
flicts, economic-political unification of the elites); II) national standardisation: 
military, cultural and linguistic (military service and compulsory education, 
mass media, communication routes: roads, railways, post, telegraphs etc.); (III) 
participation and political representation (extension of the rights of universal 
suffrage, political rights, formation of political parties, free and political elec-
tions, regulation of citizenship); and IV) redistribution of resources (welfare ser-
vices, insurance, social citizenship, redistributive policies, progressive taxation). 
The autonomy of the State, its capacity to shape society (create markets and na-
tions) should not cause us to forget the social conditioning of state institutions: 
the class conflict always constituted the fundamental cleavage in the process of 
democratisation and, in turn, the entrance of the popular classes onto the na-
tional political stage was a central aspect of national State-building in Europe 
(Bartolini, 2005). 
However, as Montesquieu lucidly observed, that “suppression of intermediary 
powers”, a vast, unprecedented concentration of means of domination, could 
very well make “of the English one of the most enslaved peoples on earth”. It 
would be this monopoly of political power and this separation of State from civil 
society which would motivate the demands and conflicts to construct a new sys-
tem of legitimacy, by means of which the new dominant classes of landowners 
could control and participate, with individual and political guarantees, in deci-
sion-making and the drafting of laws: the liberal State. Hence the debates and 
the reconfigurations of the British parliamentary monarchy and the appearance 
of the Whig and Tory parties as mechanisms of aggregation of political prefer-
ences via the election/political representation nexus which allowed for the for-
mation of majorities and thus the taking of decisions. Precisely because the new 
political power emerges as a potential threat to civil society (now deprived of any 
power), the new emerging social sectors promote changes of enormous scope; 
among others: kings must abide by the laws of parliament, taxation requires the 
consent of the legislative chambers, the law guarantees respect for the property 
of the bourgeoisie, the army no longer belongs to the king but becomes national 
and controlled by parliament, parliament is nominated by free and selective 
elections, and the rights to expression, assembly and association are extended. 




cess in the United Kingdom (17th c.), in France with the Second Republic (1850), 
or in the Germany of the Weimar Republic (1918-1833). Let us analyse the prin-
ciple axes of this process. 
The first axis of State-building is that of the conflicts and processes of democ-
ratisation/de-democratisation: under these circumstances trajectories are not 
linear, but possess differentiated advances and reverses in each country; neither 
are they simultaneous nor homogenous, mutating extraordinarily from case to 
case. A decisive factor in democratisation is the relative capacity of each State, in 
other words, its efficiency when it comes to implementing the political decisions 
it adopts. This is a key dimension, since the relative capacity of a State lies in the 
level and intensity with which the action of state agents more or less significantly 
affects the distribution of resources and power, and the activities and interper-
sonal connections existing in a specific territory (Tilly, 2007). However, a high 
capacity may be at the service of processes of both authoritarianism and democ-
ratisation but, in any case, no real democracy is possible without the effective 
capacity of the State to implement its decisions. In fact, democracies in States of 
low capacity tend to be failed democracies, with a proliferation of violent con-
flicts, the presence of war lords, large areas beyond the reach of the power of the 
State and presence of a chaotic and uncoordinated multiplicity of political ac-
tors. The most creditworthy comparative empirical research reveals that it is the 
weakness of States, their low capacity, and not ethnic or nationalist conflict 
which is the factor that explains violence and the appearance of civil wars. States 
incapable of imposing with efficiency legitimate decisions and sanctioning 
non-compliance of the law, of administrating and incorporating their territorial 
peripheries or of providing their populations with services and basic public 
goods are those most prone to endemic crisis and civil war (Laitin, 2007). 
The second axis of the process of State -building that should be examined is 
the question of the Nation, the production of national-States, that is, of States at 
the service of the culture, language and economic interests of the majority nation 
in the State territory. Initially, the Nation is constructed from the State (standard 
language, shared myths and symbols, national history etc.) as a community re-
inforcement of individual citizenship, legitimator of the legal, fiscal and military 
effort demanded of populations. Later, the creation of state-based capitalisms as 
a result of competition and international coordination between major powers, 
translated into the strengthening of State nationalism at the end of the 19th cen-
tury. In both cases, national ethnic identity acts as a cognitive psychological 
mechanism of reduction of complexity and uncertainty and contributes signifi-
cantly to the placement of human beings in a system of economically and mili-
tarily competitive States. This process of nationalisation of the citizenry of States 
crystallised politically in a very different way in each country, via the specific ar-
ticulation, in each case and at each historic moment, of two elements: 1) an eth-
nicity (history, culture, values, myths, symbols) elaborated politically with mate-
rials inherited, chosen and invented by intellectuals, leaders and nationalist par-




international competitive capitalism. National identity thus provides a kind of 
lens through which are interpreted the preferences and expectations of the 
maximisation of the opportunities of each State, providing: 1) the specific crite-
ria of common national belonging (language, history, religion, “race”, territory 
etc.); 2) political mobilisation of those differential factors for the key distinction 
we/they, one’s own/another’s, friend/enemy; and 3) articulating these shared 
elements and this difference with other nations (within or beyond the State bor-
ders ) by means of a historical narrative and a mythical-symbolic complex of de 
belonging/exclusion. National identity-always politically created, never natural- 
precedes the defence of national economic interests, because it provides the 
reading criterion through which the latter are interpreted (Hale 2008). In this 
way, the process of liberal State-building is doubled with the process of national 
construction: it is not the Nation which segregates its own State, but rather the 
State that conforms its Nation. It is the State which, in certain cases, processes 
and contexts, and not in others, monopolises political power as State -Nation 
while it builds a national State, in other words, a more or less homogenous 
community with the same culture, language, history, myths and symbols shared 
by most citizens. Some States (France) also evinced more capacity to nationalise 
their populations than others, which, in their diverse trajectories of construction 
as national-States, maintained o promoted an increasingly activated plurina-
tional structure (Spain, United Kingdom).  
States created nations via a slow, plural and uneven process which, as Eugen 
Weber demonstrated in his day, required a highly efficient capacity to national-
ise, which, in turn, depends on the relative capacity of each State, deployed via 
policies such as, among others: 1) universal conscription for the army, 2) gener-
alised compulsory schooling, 3) national transport and communication system, 
4) national work market etc. (Weber, 1976). The national State, therefore, 
re-elaborates the ethnic-national and economic preconditions within a certain 
structure of more or less favourable political historical opportunity, providing 
the material and moral resources, the nationalist ideology and the mythical 
symbolic linguistic complex and its cultural generalisation which lead or do not 
lead, as the case may be, the appearance of a national conscience shared by the 
majority of citizens or on the contrary, fuel a plurinational conflict with various 
demands for self-government or secession on the part of some territories. 
The third axis of the process of State-building is the creation of the economy 
and “national markets”, in other words, of a capitalism based on the state. The 
English and French revolutions showed clearly that national States played a de-
cisive role in the rise of the new bourgeois classes and of national capitalism, and 
vis-à-vis both the old noble classes in decline and the rise of the new working 
classes. At the same time States participated very actively in two key aspects of 
the construction of capitalisms and national markets; namely: 1) processes of 
colonisation and 2) diplomatic (treaties) and military (wars) support for foreign 





States created markets, and not vice versa. The industrial revolution in Eng-
land, for example, was facilitated by the systematic intervention of the State in 
the protection of contracts and of property rights, which resulted in more effi-
cient organisation and insurance of markets. Specifically, it was especially in the 
regulation of property rights by the British State and not the laissez-faire of the 
free play of markets which was the decisive factor that reduced transaction costs 
and with them the economies of scale, creating from above more integrated 
markets and higher levels of specialisation and productivity (North, 1981). In 
turn, the sovereign Parliament acted as a crucial guarantor of rights and free-
doms which facilitated the entry of new elites, more dynamic and with innova-
tive ideas (Mokyr, 2009). 
These kinds of processes led in turn to the gradual creation of regulating 
States, with increasing intervention in the productive economy, commerce, in-
frastructures, legislation and international commercial, political, industrial ex-
pansion, etc. n a scenario of commercial competition and wars. Wars that de-
manded resources, the creation of well armed and supplied armies, new and 
costly weaponry, tax collection, the development of bureaucracies and, finally, 
large-scale heavy industrial production. With the passage of time, during the 
transition from the 19th to the 20th century, and with the support of the State, 
national capitalisms were transformed via processes of concentration, centralisa-
tion, monopolisation and international expansion via commerce, financial capi-
tal, export of capital, formation of multinational groups and, this should never 
be forgotten, colonialism. All of this increased competition between national and 
foreign capitals, encouraged protectionist measures on the part of States and 
stimulated the internationalisation of financial capital, always at the service of 
national capitalism regulated by each State. Thus was born a capitalism of a 
clearly state and national stamp, but which was coordinated and competed in-
ternationally. Even when States participated in international cartels, they did so 
in order to protect their own interests and maintain control of national capital. 
This State regulating national capitalism found its maximum expression in the 
1930s with Keynesianism. However, the Project of national capitalism regulated 
by and from each State required, in turn, reinforced democratic legitimacy, free 
of internal conflicts and the backing of consumers and workers, which resulted 
in new concessions of rights, higher salaries and inducement of mass consump-
tion. 
In short, state regulation is crucial to the understanding of national economy. 
The poverty or wealth of States does not depend on culture (Catholicism or 
Protestantism, for instance) or la geography (North or South), but, above all, on 
the design and function of state institutions. Thus, economic development is the 
consequence of technological and productive advances, which, in turn, require 
the existence of inclusive political institutions, that is to say, which are central-
ised, pluralist and open and permit he access of new social sectors with innova-
tive ideas. Otherwise, where extractive state institutions prevail—which concen-




power-the elites deprive the rest of society of the vast majority of resources, 
maintain unacceptable levels of inequality, erect barriers to change and mod-
ernisation and restrict novelty and progress. This role of breaking down barriers 
to innovation and growth, via new open, pluralist and competitive institutional 
designs is the most significant medium-term consequence of revolutions such as 
those that occurred in France and England (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). 
Only at the end of the 19th century did the working classes in the more de-
veloped countries begin to fight in organised fashion and attain certain political 
(universal suffrage, assembly, demonstration etc.) and social rights (strike, lim-
ited working hours and improved working conditions). The concentration of 
capital encourages the organisation of workers into parties and trade unions and 
increases, in this way, their capacity to exert pressure upon States and the ruling 
classes in order to attain social improvements. Nonetheless, just as occurred with 
the process of democratisation of States, neither did the appearance of Welfare 
States result endogenously from a linear evolution of States, but as a conse-
quence of the class struggle between capital and work and political organisation 
and mobilisation of workers. In fact, the State did not create from above, gener-
ally speaking, the instruments of social insurance, its initial role consisted more 
in assuming, via different institutional channels and institutional, the systems of 
insurance arising from hose conflicts and negotiations between capital and work, 
rendering them obligatory (Del Pino & Rubio, 2016). In continental Europe 
(Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands) and unlike the in the United Sates, 
where market solutions were adopted to establish national insurance systems, 
mutual social security companies were created, protected and extended by the 
State, but retaining their relative autonomy. In the United Kingdom and the 
Nordic countries, meanwhile, what would be developed was a state model of 
protection and universal insurance for workers. 
Furthermore, social rights and social citizenship, constitutive elements of the 
Welfare State, are inseparable, in their genesis, from the processes, autonomous 
and overlapping, of democratisation and guarantee of political rights, of con-
solidation and development of a national capitalism (growth in public spending 
that is compatible with economic growth), as well as the nationalisation of 
States, and therefore arise from a certain logic of demercantilisation of the civic 
condition. This complex logic which superimposes processes of welfare, democ-
ratisation, nationalisation and construction of a national capitalism, presents a 
wide variety in time and substantial differences between different countries. In 
this sense three worlds of Welfare state: have been identified 1) liberal: where 
administration of welfare is effected from the market and which promotes low 
levels of benefits and insurance; 2) corporatist (Bismarckian or continental): 
where insurance institutions are protected by the State, but which retains a high 
degree of autonomy in the management of programmes, de-commercialisation 
is average and benefits are high, but very unequal; and 3) social democratic: with 
a high level of de-commercialisation and universality which provides a high level 





In this manner, in the 1970s and 1980s the States of Germany, France, Austria; 
Belgium and the Netherlands were configured as Welfare States characterised 
by : 1) obligatory nature and generalisation of insurance (retirement, health and 
accidents at work, unemployment benefit), based on contributions proceeding 
from salaries; 2) access to the system via contributions proceeding from salaries; 
3) financing of the latter via social contributions; 4) cash benefits; 5) corporative 
bureaucratic structures with participation by the State and social agents; 6) av-
erage level of de-commercialisation; and 7) high levels of inequality between in-
siders (skilled workers, civil servants) and outsiders (women, young people, un-
skilled workers, immigrants). 
In the process of creation of Welfare States and their diversity a key factor is 
to be found in the very diverse institutional materiality of the State, which re-
stricts the range of possibilities of action available to political parties and the el-
ites. Thus, the extension of Welfare States in different countries does not depend 
so much on culture or political preferences as on the institutional structure of 
decision-making: neo-corporatist in Sweden or pluralist, in the USA, for exam-
ple (Steinmo, 1993). But at the same time preferences, beliefs and ideas are often 
endogenous and not exogenous to institutions, in other words, they are learnt, 
they are transmitted, but are also disputed, whenever actors not only reproduce 
institutions, but also modify them. States not only change as a result of external 
shocks (international economic crises, wars), but via endogenous processes of 
evolution, adaptation and conflict (Steinmo, 2010). Also, the fact that health care 
in some countries is administered via a national and centralised system, whilst 
others opt for decentralised and fragmented insurance systems, is explained by 
the presence in each country of powers of veto that made it necessary to negoti-
ate with interests groups. The rules of the game—specific for health policy and 
general for the political system as a whole-encouraged different political strate-
gies for the actors involved, which led to divergent results (Immergut, 1992). 
Finally, as I commented earlier, the logic of States is at the same time both na-
tional and international, as all of them interact within a system of States. On the 
one hand, during the 19th century and until well into the 20th (the 1980s), there 
was a gradual intensification of the processes of colonialisation, of growth in 
foreign trade, of internationalisation and of financialisation of the economy; on 
the other, the prevailing logic was not of globalisation but of nationalisation in 
the strictest sense. And it was this wave of nationalisation, promoted by States, 
which led to the increase in State nationalisms, a competing world logic between 
entre capitalisms and national States, which led to an escalation of confrontation 
between States and, finally, two so-called World Wars. 
Even in the post-war period and until the 1980s we find a logic that, although 
it anticipates some processes of the subsequent globalisation, remains however a 
legacy of the system of de competition/coordination between States and national 
capitalisms. Breton Woods and the creation of the FMI and the World Bank, 




openness to markets, but the final stage of international coordination between 
States and national capitals. This system combined four fundamental character-
istics: 1) un gran protagonismo fiscal, rising public spending and a decisive 
regulatory role of States (state control of stock markets and protection of the na-
tional financial system from international fluctuations); 2) control and supervi-
sion of exchange rates and international movements of capital and internal eco-
nomic management aimed at protecting the national economy and, above all, 
full employment in each country in spite of international upheavals. In other 
words, States participate on the international multilateral stage but in order to 
protect their national economies; 3) the creation and reinforcement of a multi-
lateral system that is established by maintaining and even strengthening public 
administration of the economy, via reform but not dismantling of the Welfare 
State and regulation of finance capital and banking; 4) the protagonism of the 
world economic power of the USA, via the dollarization of the world economy, 
which translates into a process of “Americanisation” more than true globalisa-
tion (Sasoon 2006). In short, the increasing hegemony of financial should not 
cause us to forget that the international economic system of the Breton Woods 
era is essentially controlled by States and is, therefore, very different from the 
neo-liberal globalisation of the 1980s, a consequence, as we shall now see, of very 
different parameters. 
5. Neoliberal Statism 
From the strategic and relational perspective that I have been employing–in 
which each State constitutes a crystallisation of forces, a conflictive and disputed 
set of varied legacies of political culture, institutional structures and public poli-
cies, which articulate in a specific manner diverse regimes of democracy and 
welfare-various questions are posed when it comes to explaining the degree to 
which the processes of 21st-century globalisation and their crises affect the State 
itself. For, after all, each specific State is responsible for, in the absence of a coac-
tive international order, the historical failures and achievements in processes of 
democratisation and welfare. As we have seen, in the institutional materiality of 
each and every State are to be found the successful hegemonic projects and the 
concessions obtained via the struggles for freedom, democracy and welfare. 
Have the functions of the State been eroded by the processes of privatisation, 
deregulation, mercantilisation and dependence upon the flow of international 
financial capital, to the point of losing its place on the political scenario, par ex-
cellence, of conflicts over democracy and equality? Are States inexorably subject 
to the logic and the politics dictated by international capital? Should we replace, 
then, the very notion of State with that of “Empire” (Negri & Hardt, 2001), or 
that of Law with “Global law without a State” (Teubner, 1997). 
Diverse studies refute, with varying nuances, the loss of the strategic and func-
tional character of States, and underline their centrality and capacity to adapt to 
the new context of globalisation (Robinson, 2004; Slaughter, 2004; Sassen, 2006; 




ous aspects that are decisive in the evaluation of the new role of States in today’s 
world: 1) globalisation constitutes neither an entirely new (States were always 
inside the world market), nor unitary, universal and homogenous logic (this is 
an uneven, contingent, irregular and multiform process). The consequence of 
ignoring this spatial complexity and this continuity/discontinuity in time is that 
processes of globalisation are misinterpreted as a deceptive zero-sum game: what 
“markets” gain, “States” lose; 2) contrary to the popular thesis of “convergence” 
(of the neo-liberal levelling down of welfare in every country) we should recall 
that globalisation is processed in adaptative fashion in a very different way by 
different States, depending on their institutional legacies and public policies, on 
their political culture, on the correlation of forces and the different coalitions of 
parties which govern them. 
Having clarified the above, let me synthesise some key aspects of the effect of 
globalisation upon regulatory and welfare States in the 20th century XX: 1) eco-
nomic interdependence and the formation of global systems are implemented, 
on many occasions, from the States themselves. Certainly, the State system no 
longer operates with the same prominence or the autonomy as prior to the 
1980s, and processes de deterritorialisation (not “denationalisation”) have been 
accentuated. But the national and the global are not mutually exclusive dimen-
sions: the global market requires national actions and policies. It is States which 
facilitate and participate in diverse fashion in the genesis of global markets and 
in the smooth functioning of multinational companies. In short, globalisation 
constitutes a process that is largely endogenous to the national State (Sassen, 
2006); 2) state adaptation to globalisation, via the (very different in each coun-
try) processes of mercantilisation, deregulation and privatisation, generates 
changes in terms of the internal redistribution of political power (division of 
powers) in the state sphere: executive power clearly prevails over, generally 
speaking, legislative (and judicial) power. More than in terms of simple loss of 
state power, therefore, the changes should be analysed as a deterioration of the 
democratic and representative quality of States (Aman, 2004; Mair, 2013; Urbi-
nati, 2014); 3) there is something more than mere deregulation in neo-liberal 
structural reforms: the endogenous processes of States involve, then, an expan-
sion of the private sphere at the expense of the public sphere, not only in terms 
of expansion of the private sphere at the expense of the public, and the fact that 
the markets perform functions that previously corresponded to the public sector 
(mercantilisation of public functions), but also the gradual insertion of private 
interests into the sphere of public policies. The markets undergo an expansion of 
the goods and services they regulate (and therefore subject to the logic of 
short-term profit, to inequality and to neglect of “external diseconomies”), and 
invade functions that corresponded to the public sector and its democratic crite-
ria of accountability. The regulatory and Welfare State becomes, not only for 
global reasons but also for inherently endogenous ones, an efficient and com-
petitive State “the markets”, in such a way that the logic of the global capital 




of the “power of the State”, not even only of “the Welfare State”, but of some-
thing even more basic, the minimum preconditions necessary for the normal 
functioning of democracy: limitation of inequality, citizenship in the fullest 
sense, undistorted information etc. (Brown, 2015). 
Ultimately, the State, or rather, States, are very resilient and continue to play a 
fundamental political role in globalisation. Even in their dimension as Welfare 
States they are resistant to policies of cut-backs, privatisation and dismantling. 
Neither the undoubted decline of their electoral support (the organised and 
skilled working class), nor the intensive neo-liberal “structural reforms” which, 
of course, have brought about very significant changes, have resulted in a pure 
and simple liquidation, accelerated and unstoppable, of the social capital of pub-
lic policies and institutional arrangements of regulation and welfare. Neither has 
this occurred in uniform or homogenous manner in different countries. Path 
dependence and legal and institutional legacies have led citizens and organisa-
tions previously adapted to regulatory arrangements, have made huge invest-
ments in human, institutional and financial capital which make the costs of 
change prohibitive or, in any case, higher than the costs of relative continuity 
(Pierson, 1994). 
Welfare States have demonstrated a very unequal, adaptative and self-trans- 
forming capacity, and their trajectory has depended, in each particular case, on 
the specific correlation of forces, the profile of political hegemony and the suc-
cesses or failures of popular struggles. The state sphere retains a key scenario 
function precisely because it is transformed internally to locate itself at the ful-
crum of a new distribution of sub- and supra-national powers, playing an irre-
placeable role for the extended reproduction of capital. The decline in the de-
mands for sovereignty (always ideal, let us not forget) and the increasing domi-
nation of the logic of financial capital, should not be extrapolated in the thesis of 
an entirely global society in which States, as opposed to a supposed “Golden 
Age” which never existed, play a decadent and peripheral role.  
The existence of powerful trends of inequality in neo-liberal States in no way 
implies a homogenisation or convergence of capitalism on a global scale which 
reduces or renders irrelevant the differences between countries. In fact, the ho-
mogenising tendency of markets is countered by the counter-trend of “politics as 
a source of diversity” and the political parties and their dominant coalitions con-
tinue to campaign and govern in each country with alternative policies and pro-
grammes, with very different results. The problem of today’s societies is that 
structural class changes result in citizens expressing more complex and differen-
tiated preferences, which underlines the autonomy of politics and the processes 
of production of preferences, identities ad actors in each State. Moreover, the 
political space of contemporary capitalism is two-dimensional, with one 
well-known axis which revolves around greater or lesser state regulation of the 
economy, and another, less familiar, but which has proved to be very significant 
for the dimension of democracy and welfare, referring to the balance between 




investment, which affect different social classes in very diverse fashion (Bera-
mendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt, & Kriesi, 2015).  
The result of public policies arising from the current consensus regarding 
“structural reforms” consists not only in the slimming down of the public or the 
strengthening of mercantilisation, but in the alteration of the political balance 
and of the correlation of forces. The decline of trade unions, as a consequence of 
the crisis, constitutes a key element of the process. Indeed, the unions, as well as 
their economic role of counterweight in the regulation of the work market (sala-
ries, working conditions) play a fundamental political role in the creation of 
other actors, such as the Labour and Social Democratic parties, which, in turn, 
influenced at the time the State’s pre-distributive and redistributive political 
policies on Welfare, in confrontation with the demands of capital. This is why 
policies that restrict or eliminate the capacity of unions to achieve decent salaries 
for workers not only generate a further transfer of income from workers to capi-
tal, but indirectly reduce union activity, weaken decisive actors for the working 
class and alter the political relationship of forces in favour of the dominant elites. 
In short, the hegemonic strategies and policies of privatisation in the crisis affect 
the distribution of political power within States, strengthening the dominion of 
oligarchies, which, in turn, push for new deregulation and privatisation.  
The new neo-liberal global context has revealed that traditional State Welfare 
policies result now, with emergence of precarious employment, in special atten-
tion to sectors with stable employment (insiders), and the margination of those 
others in a precarious situation part-time or temporary employment) or unem-
ployed (outsiders). The consequence of which is, in fact, the adoption of less 
egalitarian public policies and the abandonment of growing sectors of the elec-
torate available for other partisan options (anti-political, exclusive nationalisms, 
xenophobic far-right etc.). The work market dualism between insiders and out-
siders has important consequences for public welfare policies. indeed, this dual-
ism not only involves a bifurcation that excludes broad sectors, but questions the 
prevailing policies in many contemporary States of protection ex ante, which, 
benefitting the more privileged sectors in the work market, lead to policies ori-
ented towards consumption and facilitate the capture of income in the public 
sector. On the contrary, compensation ex post are crucial to avoid the exclusive 
effect and the generation of inequality of opportunities in Access to the work 
market and to encourage policies oriented towards investment and innovation 
and the political coalitions that promote them (Rueda, 2007). 
The tension and variation between countries in processes of conversion to 
state and globalisation may be analysed as a set of trends and counter-trends 
(Jessop, 2016); among the most relevant we can list: 1) the denationalisation of 
the State and the delegation of powers towards supranational and subnational 
entities are countered by a reaction by States to control the multiscale dynamic 
and even the emergence and reinforcement of new nationalisms of the State or 
against the State; 2) the increasing trend towards consensual governance and the 




of coordination, intervention and new leadership on the part of States; 3) in re-
sponse to the gradual internationalisation of public policies, the creation of alli-
ances and new international regimes in defence of the interests of major powers 
and their allies.  
I have already mentioned the fact that the process of globalisation has in-
volved not only relative deterritorialisation, mercantilisation and prevalence of 
the executive over the executive. Moreover, a strategic and relational vision of 
the State requires attention to the changes in the relations of power and crisis 
democratic and representative legitimacy of States. In this sense, to the axes of 
institutions and actors that underpin Welfare states: 1) The regulatory State and 
its representative and redistributive mechanisms, 2) citizens as working classes 
in the broad sense, civil servants, pensioners etc. Represented by parties and un-
ions; to this should be added the emergence of a new power in pursuit of he-
gemony: 3) the new constellation of national and international actors in finan-
cial markets. The decline of unions, of neo-corporatist agreements, of electoral 
participation and the offensive in favour of a new consensus in neo-liberal re-
forms (deregulation, privatisation), do not take the form of a natural evolution 
of the cycles of the capitalist economy, but as the result of the strategy of the 
powerful actor that is financial capital, which alters, in a different manner in 
each State, the terms of the traditional capital/work dialectic. A constellation of 
companies, various investment trust funds, etc. Drive a coordinated offensive 
-economic, political and ideological–of privatisation and deregulation of the 
economy on a global scale. A strategy that, incidentally, met with uneven resis-
tance in each country from traditional actors like unions and social democratic 
parties (Streeck, 2014).  
All this has resulted in changes not only in the economic policies and the in-
stitutional arrangements of Welfare, but in the very fabric of the social and or-
ganisational capital of civil society, with the consequent decline in civic and 
trade union associations and the emergence and reinforcement of very powerful 
interest groups (Skocpol 2003). This strategy should be addressed in terms of 
both its objectives-austerity, dismantling, deregulation, privatisation–and the 
political channels it serves, as it is exercised not only via votes and the dominant 
political parties, but, also, via the invisible mechanism of pressure groups and 
their influence beyond electoral politics, a politics of genuine “organised com-
bat” as is shown by the enormous increase in the sums of money spent on lob-
bying in the USA (Hacker & Pierson, 2010) and in the European Union. Organ-
ised groups possess a growing capacity to mobilise economic, communicative 
and intellectual resources, and to coordinate in an effective manner their action 
at multiple levels, both state and international. In this way the State of (public) 
law gradually becomes a State of private law. 
However, as we have seen, politics matters and, in each specific State, the dif-
ferent parties continue to provide a non-convergent panorama from the ideo-
logical point of view of alternative programmes for electors, so the explicative 




realignment and restructuring of the system of competition than a supposed 
cartelisation and generalised dealignment (Thelen, 2014). 
Ultimately, neo-liberal globalisation plays a decisive role not only in eliminat-
ing the State, following libertarian guidelines, but in reformulating and restruc-
turing it anti-democratically, reducing the perimeter of citizenship and rights. 
This is the problem we face today: by no means are we witnessing a linear proc-
ess of deregulation, on the contrary, in the 2000s this was confirmed by the cen-
trality of States in global capitalism and there appeared a new perspective of neo 
regulation by other means, focussed on the obsession with competitiveness and 
security. As a result neo-liberalism moves inexorably away from the conservative 
anarchist ethos of libertarianism (Plant, 2010). The State has gone from being 
the objective of the neo-liberal offensive to being a key actor (Panitch & Gindin, 
2013), the instrument of this offensive of extension of deregulated markets, of 
privatisation of the public sector and cutbacks in rights and citizenship. This 
new and for some unthinkable neo-liberal statism (“liberal neowelfarism”, “lib-
eral neoestatism”), seeks both to impose internally, via public policies and po-
litical and administrative reforms, the prevailing vision of austerity and privati-
sation; and externally the defence of the interests of national capital in the inter-
national sphere (Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013).  
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we could say, using Mark Twain’s famous quote, that the report 
about the death of the State in the globalization context “was an exaggeration”. 
Contrary to the hastily drawn-up death certificates, arising from an incorrect 
premodern extension of its origins, everything explained in this article returns 
the State and State systems to their place at the centre of the political stage, albeit 
increasingly degraded, where political struggles take place that are crucial for 
democracy and equality in our age. Sovereignty was always a claim, a desiderata 
not an empirical fact. The State is not immortal as Le Roi Soleil dreamed of be-
ing, but it is still very resilient, adaptative and functional for neo-liberal capital-
ism. In order to understand the evolution of the State in the Global era, statist, 
imperial cosmopolitan or “Stack” visions are not appropriate, neither empiri-
cally nor legally. Indeed, in the first place, in a world of fragmented and shared 
sovereignties, a theory of State (and of Nation) that maintains the monist and 
theological-political tenets of sovereignism is an insane anachronism (Cohen, 
2012). Secondly, the normative/empirical theory that postulates the appearance 
of a new form of postmodern domination, the Empire, different from the classic 
Imperialism of States, is premature and inaccurate, even as a mere trend. Neither 
does there exist a single power, a system of domination on a global scale that 
renders States irrelevant, nor a deterritorialised and atemporal power structure 
which has neither capital nor strategic centre. Nor do we live in a permanent 
State of exception, under a form of domination that moves from the disciplinary 
society to the society of total control as the result of an immanent historical ne-




and the multilevel cosmopolitanism that legally requires, in turn, a cosmopolitan 
constitution (Held, 2010), is not appropriate in order to explain the ongoing 
processes within the system of neo-liberal deregulated and de-democratised 
States, not in spite of, but via their own governments and “structural reforms”. 
Finally, it seems hardly plausible the hypothesis that The Stack, the world of 
global digital networks and platforms could create a ubiquitous and vertical 
“Nomos of the Cloud” withering away the key political role of the states (Brat-
ton, 2015). 
Rather than the chimerical classical sovereignist statism and the excessively 
hasty postmodern diagnosis of the generalised vanishing of the State, a historical 
neo-institutionalist (Steinmo, 2010; Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013; Thelen, 2014) 
and, at the same time, strategic and relational vision (Poulantzas, 1978; Jessop, 
2016), which addresses the struggles for democracy and equality, integrated 
within the changing adaptative institutional materiality of the neo-liberal system 
of States and its resilience, is a more plausible explanatory alternative to give an 
account of the structures and actors present in the economic and 
socio-ecological crisis, and of the new emerging national and international con-
flicts in today’s world. 
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